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This year marks the 100th anniversary of the 1918 “Spanish Flu” outbreak that killed 50-100 
million people worldwide. If a pandemic of this proportion happened today, the federal pandemic 
influenza plan predicts that 30 percent of the population could become infected with up to 50 
percent seeking outpatient care. With Nebraska Medicine currently operating at nearly full 
capacity (95-97%), surge capacity for hospital space, staff, and supplies would be in severe 
demand and would quickly overwhelm the organization. To assess the impact of pandemic 
influenza in Douglas County Nebraska and Nebraska Medicine, pandemic modeling tool FluAid 
and FluSurge 2.0 were used to project and illustrate the demand for hospital resources during 
surge events. FluSurge estimates the number of hospital admissions, ICU and ventilator capacity 
and deaths due to pandemic influenza. Projections are made under variable duration (6, 8, and 12 
weeks) and virulence (15%, 25%, and 35 %) scenarios and compares hospital resources needed 
during pandemic influenza with existing hospital resources. Results indicate during a moderate to 
severe influenza pandemic, the percentage of Nebraska Medicine’s capacity needed to care for flu 
patients would double by week 2. Considering the results and disease burden of pandemic 
influenza on Nebraska Medicine, recommendations for the hospital include topics for discussion 
and specific preparedness and response actions in order to increase hospital capacity and 
capabilities for future surge events.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Background 
 This year marks the 100th anniversary of the deadly 1918 “Spanish flu” pandemic. From 
1918 to 1920, one-quarter of the U.S. and one-fifth of the world was infected. Records estimate 
675,000 people in the United States and between 50-100 million people worldwide died due to 
the influenza A (H1N1) virus (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2017). Affiliates from 
the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology state, since the 1918 outbreak, all influenza A pandemics 
worldwide (excluding avian viruses H5N1 and H7N7), have been descendants (comprised of key 
genes) of this particular virus, making the 1918 pandemic the “mother” of all pandemics 
(Taubenberger and Morens, 2006). Taubenberger and Morens acknowledge the emergence of a 
new H2N2 (“Asian Flu”) strain in 1957, caused the direct 1918 H1N1 influenza descendants to 
disappear entirely from human circulation. It was not until 1977 when the human H1N1 virus 
“reemerged” from a laboratory freezer causing the virus to circulate endemically and 
epidemically (Taubenberger and Morens, 2006).   
Dr. Girish Kapur, author of Emergency Public Health: Preparedness and Response, 
specifics, “public health concerns regarding emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases…have 
been increasing in recent years” as a result of inciting factors such as physical environmental 
transformations caused by climate change, encroachment into new environments previously 
uninhabited, and deforestation; human activities (e.g. global trade and travel, immigration, 
globalization of food supply, growing populations, overcrowding); social, political and economic 
factors (civil conflicts and war, crumbling public health infrastructures); bioterrorism; 
and increased resistance to drugs and antibiotics (Kapur, 2010). The World Health Organization 
(WHO) elaborates that pandemics spread worldwide at faster rates due to globalization. “Past 
influenza pandemics have spread worldwide within six to nine months. Given the heavy volume 
of international travel in the 21st century, it is likely that a pandemic would spread globally 
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within approximately three months” (WHO, 2005). These statistics demonstrate just how rapid 
the virus could spread, and how many people worldwide it could possibly infect. Concerns over 
how public health and healthcare systems will prepare and potentially respond to an influenza 
pandemic on the same scale as the 1918 pandemic keep health professionals examining the 
complex aspects of surge capacity and capability. 
  Rubinson et al., describes the looming threat of a severe influenza pandemic, and the 
debate among hospitals and critical care services on how to care for critically ill people during 
pandemic surge events. The article states, even with existing investments in disaster 
preparedness, many countries still lack "sufficient specialized staff, medical equipment, and ICU 
space to provide timely, usual critical care for a large influx of additional patients" (Rubinson et 
al., 2007). When developing disaster preparedness plans for patient surge Hick et al., identifies 
four key factors that contribute to effective surge response: system, space, staff, and supplies 
(Hick, 2009). A review of the literature indicates medical facilities would be overwhelmed during 
surge events. Medical Surge reports illustrate medical supplies and crisis patient care space would 
be inadequate for the increased demand over an extended period of time. Hick et al., expresses 
when refining surge and crisis capacity plans, the four described elements require contingencies 
for medical care spaces, staffing constraints, and supply shortages.  
This thesis focuses on the major challenges of hospital capacity and capabilities during an 
influenza pandemic. This thesis provides a conceptual framework to characterize potential 
pandemic disease burden on Nebraska Medicine in Douglas County Nebraska. The framework 
used for this project adopts epidemiological data from historical pandemic influenza events to 
estimate disease burden (projections) on hospitals. The data from this framework is then used to 
estimate pandemic level demands for essential supplies, space, and staff during the next 
pandemic. The goal of this thesis is to collect, interpret, and disseminate disease burden 
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information to increase health-care facilities surge capacity and capabilities, and to help pandemic 
planning operations for future surge events. 
H5N1 
Between December 2003 and October 2005, The World Health Organization received 
reports of more than 100 human cases of avian influenza A (H5N1) virus, from Egypt, Cambodia, 
China, Indonesia, Thailand and Viet Nam. A study conducted by Conly and Johnston report 
outbreaks of the H5N1 strain in the human population caused limited but severe disease with high 
fatality on four separate occasions since 1997 (Conly,2004). Osterholm and Henderson’s study on 
Respiratory Transmissible H5N1 describes the virus as having a “human case fatality rate of 60 to 
80%, placing this pathogen in the category of causing one of the most virulent known human 
infectious diseases” (Osterholm and Henderson, 2012). Concerns over the virus’s potential of 
becoming the next big pandemic, the first draft of the US Department of Health and Human 
Services’ plan for pandemic influenza response and preparedness was released, providing impetus 
for states to strengthen their own influenza pandemic plans. The summary outlines the distinctive 
characteristics and events of a pandemic will strain nationwide resources. The document goes on 
to report that it is “unlikely that there will be sufficient personnel, equipment, and supplies to 
respond adequately to multiple areas of the country for a sustained period of time” (HHS, 2005).  
A statement by HHS Secretary Mike Leavitt, released in the 2005 pandemic influenza 
plan declares, “One of the most important public health issues our Nation and the world faces is 
the threat of a global disease outbreak called a pandemic. No one in the world today is fully 
prepared for a pandemic -- but we are better prepared today than we were yesterday - and we will 
be better prepared tomorrow than we are today”(HHS, 2005). The best way to decrease influenza 
disease burden and become resilient as a nation is to create effective influenza preparedness and 
response plans. 
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During the scare of the H5N1 outbreak, Nebraska Medicine, the University of Nebraska 
Medical Center (UNMC), and UNMC-Physicians worked together to create an intensive 
influenza pandemic plan using HHS pandemic planning assumptions. The departments were 
divided into the following planning committees: support staffing, equipment and supplies, triage 
and altered standards of care, infection control/vaccination, palliative care, infrastructure and 
security, communication, behavioral health, and clinical staffing and surge. Since influenza 
affects all aspects of hospital operations, the plan also incorporated and utilized resources from 
several operations within Nebraska Medicine, UNMC and the Douglas County Health 
Department. The teams' used strategies and operations from inpatient, ambulatory, morgue, 
behavioral health, and student surge plans; altered standards of care roadmaps; documents of 
facility lockdown measures; and non-healthcare and volunteer delegation of duties listings. The 
pandemic plan prioritized response actions into seven main goals: preserve the lives and safety of 
our staff members and students; sustain our mission to provide healthcare for the community; 
protect the integrity of campus assets including property and information; minimize the financial 
impact to the campus entities; protect research resources; sustain the educational mission; and 
assist the community in mitigating adverse effects of a pandemic and facilitate community 
response and recovery. The process was complex and took nearly two years to complete. 
2009 H1N1   
Although the hospital's pandemic plan was not utilized during H5N1 (as the virus never 
became transmissible from person to person), it was used four years later during the 2009 H1N1 
outbreak. This particular strain of H1N1 had never previously been identified as a cause of 
infection in humans, this new strain presented local and national public health agencies with a 
complicated set of circumstances. Reports from the WHO record that "antigenic analysis has 
shown that antibodies to the seasonal H1N1 virus do not protect against the pandemic H1N1 
virus" (WHO, 2010). Additionally, the new virus showed death and illness patterns inconsistent 
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with previous recorded influenza infections. This shift in conditions signified major limitations in 
the healthcare system's capacity and capabilities to respond to pandemics. A report from the 2009 
H1N1 Surveillance Group concludes the H1N1 pandemic was the first test of the local, national, 
and global pandemic response plans since the re-emergence of human avian influenza cases back 
in 2003. The group specifies that future pandemic response decisions be based on "estimates of 
the transmissibility and, in some cases, the severity of the novel infection" (Lipsitch, 2011). 
The study further entails that, “rapidly generated transmissibility and severity estimates 
are essential for predicting the scale and time course of a pandemic-with influenza, most 
important are measures of severity per infected individual—that is, the probability of death, 
hospitalization, or other severe outcome” (Lipsitch, 2011). These measures will allow for 
pandemic response related plans to better estimate the demand for appropriate resources and 
supplies (such as vaccines, PPE, ventilators, staffing, and available space).  Additionally, 
estimating the severity of a virus can help calculate disease burden on hospitals (e.g. amount of 
patient hospitalizations, ICU admissions, ventilator usage, and death). Data collected from 
previous pandemic reports (such as the information above) has shown to significantly improve 
pandemic response efforts (Lipsitch, 2011). 
After Action Report 
By early May 2009, CDC reports signify a total of 2,254 confirmed cases of the H1N1 in 
the U.S. in 44 different states. The WHO monitored virus activities during phases 1-3 
(predominantly animal infections with few human infections), and phase 4 was declared when the 
virus had sustained human-to-human contact. By June 2009, the WHO raises the alert status to 
Phase 5-6, officially declaring H1N1 a pandemic. Reports state this action was a reflection of the 
spread of the new H1N1 virus, not the severity of illness caused by the virus (WHO, 2010). This 
was the first pandemic declaration in over 40 years (WHO, 2010). During this notification period, 
Nebraska Medicine implemented their pandemic plan as the basic framework and foundation of 
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response efforts and activities. Once the plan was in place the hospital quickly took notice and 
began to document the plan's successes and limitations in an after actions report. The hospital and 
campus after action report illustrates what went well, what lessons were learned, and 
opportunities for improvement:   
Things that went well: 
• Communication (quick, efficient use of Intranet-internal; employee forums; external 
public webpage and hotline) 
• Pandemic Planning Team- met promptly; action items 
• Quick updates to Key Leaders 
• Defined process to watch resources (PPE, antivirals)- “hotlist” 
• Letter to physicians regarding the proper use of antivirals 
• Vaccination Distribution Process/Decision Making 
Areas for improvement: 
• The situation did not fit the current plan 
• Patient surge plan not adequate 
• Limited available resources (PPE, vaccines, hospital beds) 
• Allocation of resources  
• Opportunity for a “Teachable Moment”: PPE donning and doffing 
• Challenge with getting continuously updated guidance out to clinicians 
• Most cases were outpatient, the ER quickly became overwhelmed 
• Need additional organizational PPE and Antivirals guidance 
• N95 mask Fit testing of hospital personnel is a “gap” 
• Community attention to standardizing Outpatient strategy and Altered Standards of Care 
• Additional flu clinic set up 
 
 (Hospital and campus after-action report, 2009)  
 The report concluded, the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic occurred against a backdrop of 
pandemic response planning at all levels of government including years of developing, refining, 
and exercising response plans. However, the preparedness efforts were largely based on a 
scenario of severe illness, often with deadly results, caused by an avian influenza (H5N1) virus. 
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Despite differences in planning scenarios and the actual 2009 H1N1 pandemic, many of the 
systems established through pandemic planning were used and helpful for the response. Final 
comments were made stating the H1N1 response was guided by "previously written pandemic 
influenza and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) Plans, though this specific incident proved the 
need for more flexible development of these plans" (Hospital and campus after-action report, 
2009).  
Current Threat 
Avian influenza A(H7N9) virus is one subgroup of influenza viruses that circulate among 
wild birds (WHO, 2013). The H7N9 virus has been detected in the past but this particular strain 
has never been previously seen in animals or humans. The first human case of avian influenza 
A(H7N9) was reported to the WHO on March 31, 2013. Now that the virus has been reported to 
have sustained animal to human transmission (those who have had recent exposure with infected 
poultry), health organizations such as the WHO, the CDC, and the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), are closely monitoring the virus for evidence of sustained human-to-human 
transmission.  This new strain is of particular concern to healthcare professionals because of those 
who do test positive for the virus become severely ill. In most cases, infection with A(H7N9) is 
characterized by high fever, cough, shortness of breath and rapidly progressing severe 
pneumonia. Complications include acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS), septic shock and 
multi-organ failure requiring intensive care (WHO, 2017). 
By July 2, 2013, the WHO reported 133 laboratory-confirmed cases of the H7N9 virus in 
8 China Provinces, during this time 43 deaths were reported due to ILI complications. Of these, 
80% either had direct contact with infected chicken or were in close proximity to live bird 
markets (WHO, 2013). According to Silva et al., H7N9 has infected humans in China in four 
waves; the first being in the spring of 2013; the second, third, and fourth waves were during 
winter-spring of 2013-14, 2014-15 and 2015-2016. The fifth wave of H7N9 has been the most 
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widespread, being reported in 23 provinces compared to 12 in the fourth wave (Silva et al., 2017). 
Yang et al., a study on H7N9 clinical and epidemiological characteristics report, medical 
complications to include acute respiratory distress syndrome, have caused prolong hospitalization 
with reports of most patients being admitted to the ICU with severe illness, later succumbing to 
the virus (Yang et al., 2017). Results from Yang et al., data collection illustrates that of the 256 
laboratory-confirmed H7N9 hospital patients, the proportion the proportion of ICU admission 
was 65.6% and the fatality rate of these confirmed cases was 39% (Yang et al., 2017). The most 
recent report (during the fifth wave) of H7N9 shows a total of 1,625 confirmed human cases of 
H7N9 with 621 deaths (FAO, 2018), this gives the virus a case fatality rate (CFR) of 38.5%. 
Although there have been no reports of sustained human-to-human transmission, a recent 
article published by Zhou et al., explains limited human-to-human transmission between two 
individuals cannot be ruled out (Zhou et al., 2017). Due to the fact that fifth epidemic wave is still 
ongoing, the potential for this virus to become the next pandemic is of great concern. After an 
extensive literature review on the current outbreak of H7N9, Nebraska Medicine decided to 
recommission their 2008 pandemic planning committee along with UNMC officials to update 
previous pandemic plans and operations.  
Statement of Problem 
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 2005 Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness and Response Plan reports that an influenza pandemic has a greater potential to 
cause rapid increases in death and illness than virtually any other natural health threat (HHS, 
2005). Unlike most viruses, influenza is not restricted to specific geographic locations, it attacks 
willfully and does not discriminate against persons. The Department of Health and Human 
Services describes pandemic influenza, not as a theoretical threat; rather, a recurring threat. HHS 
further acknowledges, “An emerging influenza pandemic virus can place extraordinary and 
sustained demands on public health and healthcare systems and on providers of essential 
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community services across the United States and throughout the world” (HHS, 2017). Research 
on influenza has shown the virus to be extremely unpredictable. Each recorded influenza 
pandemic has differed in duration, severity, and impact. Past events have revealed the healthcare 
system is not prepared to respond nor mitigate a severe influenza pandemic or to any similarly 
global, sustained and threatening public health emergency (Fineberg, 2010). 
Concerns over the possibility of another influenza pandemic have accelerated worldwide 
planning and preparedness efforts. Since the recent outbreak of influenza A(H1N1) in 2009, and 
the re-emergence of other infectious diseases over the past decade (SARS, MERS, Ebola), 
emergency management specialists are meticulously reexamining their emergency/disaster 
preparedness plans. Hospital capabilities during a severe infectious disease outbreak are 
questionable at best. Adequate and necessary supplies, space, and staff are already limited during 
seasonal influenza events, a pandemic of extreme severity could devastate and cripple the already 
stressed healthcare system. Effective and successful response efforts require engagement from the 
entire health community, and healthcare assets from across the spectrum of care in order to meet 
increased pandemic demands (CDC, 2017). 
Response efforts become further complicated when considering economic implications 
(e.g. medical cost, lost productivity, insurance premiums) and interruptions to essential services 
(e.g. food, water, facilities and environmental services (EVS), hospital occupancy, staff, 
transportation, etc.). The rapid arrival of another pandemic would be an enormous threat to the 
current public health and healthcare infrastructure. The demand for medical necessities and 
lifesaving equipment would render items like drugs, ventilators, patient beds, and personal 
protective equipment (PPE), rare commodities during a pandemic crisis. Existing hospital 
supplies would be inadequate, placing health security at risk. This project addresses this challenge 
by developing a general methodology and applying a basic disease modeling tool providing an 
influenza pandemic scenario in Douglas County Nebraska. 
10 
 
Significance of Project 
It is important to remember that the public's health depends on its healthcare systems 
ability to effectively prepare, respond, and successfully treat ongoing health threats. This project 
was conceptualized based on Nebraska Medicine and UNMC's mission to "lead the world in 
transforming lives to create a healthy future for all individuals and communities through premier 
educational programs, innovative research, extraordinary patient care and commitment to 
preserving the lives and safety of all its members".  In order to obtain the best possible health 
outcomes, hospital and campus-wide preparedness planning are critical to the community's 
sustainability. In many cases, pandemic preparedness plans are already in place, the goal is not to 
develop new ones, but rather strengthen existing ones. In their ongoing determination to 
accomplish their mission, this project is being used to enhance their preparedness efforts. This 
thesis increases those efforts by synthesizing influenza epidemiological data, pandemic 
preparedness research, literature reviews, historical reports from previous pandemic response 
events, and disease modeling.  
Planning for pandemic influenza is necessary to successfully strengthen the health care 
system's ability to respond, and to efficiently allocate scarce hospital resources (Zhang et al., 
2006). Given the focus of this thesis is estimating influenza disease burden on Nebraska 
Medicine's capacity and capabilities of patient surge, essential staff, and supplies, an assessment 
framework was used to calculate projections on the hospitals demand during an infectious disease 
outbreak or pandemic event. This thesis investigates the factors hindering hospital sustainability 
during a pandemic influenza outbreak. This project also places an emphasis on pandemic 
influenza planning as a global approach to better prepare healthcare systems for the impact 
infectious disease outbreaks can have on essential services of care. 
Kapur states that healthcare and facility-based surge capacity during an infectious disease 
outbreak is usually limited due to financial constraints that prohibit healthcare institutions from 
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stockpiling of equipment and supplies, and due to the existing shortage of healthcare providers 
and ancillary staff (Kapur, 2010). Central to this project is addressing the dilemma that hospitals 
nationwide experience during a pandemic. The information provided in this thesis can be used to 
make a case for federal funding to increase Nebraska Medicine's surge capacity and capabilities 
such as: stockpiling vital supplies and equipment, procuring proficient health care workers, and 
providing sufficient space for patient care during a pandemic. This is needed to ensure improved 
patient health outcomes, and decrease morbidity and mortality rates due to influenza. 
Additionally, the data from this thesis can provide critical records of disease burden in Douglas 
County Nebraska, and Nebraska Medicine to request an increase in the production and 
distribution of essential supplies and scarce resources from local, state, national, and federal 
government agencies. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Burden of Pandemics 
Experts have identified several viruses that have the potential to cause the next global 
pandemic. Over the past few decades, the world has experienced the emergence and re-
emergence of global infectious diseases such as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), 
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), Ebola, and Influenza. In November of 2002, a 
SARS outbreak spread over 26 countries affecting over 8,000 people, killing 775. Since April 
2012, the WHO reports there have been 2,100 laboratory-confirmed cases of MERS in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia including 813 associated deaths (case-fatality rate: 38%). For over 40 
years the Ebola virus has plagued Central and West Africa, killing 50 to 90% of those who 
became infected. Between 2014 and 2016, West Africa experienced one of the largest and most 
complex outbreaks of Ebola (Zaire ebolavirus species). As of 2017, The Democratic Republic of 
the Congo has reported a total of 1,060 cases with 811 reported deaths (WHO, 2017). 
The frequency in which infectious disease outbreaks have occurred (nearly one every 
decade) has public health officials proclaiming we are becoming increasingly susceptible to 
another pandemic event (WHO, 2017). While a majority of these diseases are typically confined 
to specific geographic locations, SARS (Asia), MERS (Saudi Arabia), and Ebola (Central and 
West Africa), influenza is a global threat. When UNMC’s co-director of the Global Center for 
Health Security Dr. James Lawler was asked what he worries about when it comes to the next 
pandemic threat, his response was, "Most significantly I worry about flu," "The projections 
regarding a 1918-like pandemic in the modern world are truly catastrophic and so to me, that's 
still the biggest single threat" (UNMC Newsroom, 2018). Dr. Michael Osterholm, director of the 
Center for Infectious Diseases Research and Policy (CIDRAP) at the University of Minnesota 
carries the same sentiment stating, “There’s nothing really that can impact on a national level — 
or for that matter on an international level — more quickly than influenza” (Osterholm, 2017).  
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Influenza 
 The CDC defines influenza as “a contagious respiratory illness caused by influenza 
viruses that infect the nose, throat, and sometimes the lungs that can cause mild to severe illness 
and even death”. It is believed that the flu virus is spread “mainly by tiny droplets made when 
people with flu cough, sneeze or talk” (CDC, 2016). Individuals infected with a flu virus typically 
develop mild symptoms which are often confused with the common cold seeing as the virus 
affects the upper respiratory system. It is characterized by fever (or feeling feverish/chills), 
fatigue, headaches, cough, sore throat, runny or stuffy nose, and in some cases, vomiting and 
diarrhea are reported (CDC, 2016). The CDC reports that most individuals who are infected with 
the flu normally recover within a few days, although, some complications may last for one to two 
weeks. In this case, the virus is considered to be more severe. 
The CDC explains that individuals who develop more severe symptoms due to the 
influenza virus experience more serious health complications such as; “infection of the upper 
respiratory tract (nasal passages, throat) and lower respiratory tract (lungs), asthma, pneumonia, 
inflammation of the heart (myocarditis), brain (encephalitis) or muscle (myositis, 
rhabdomyolysis) tissues, and multi-organ failure (for example, respiratory and kidney failure)”. 
Additional reports have shown, “Flu virus infection of the respiratory tract can trigger an extreme 
inflammatory response in the body and can lead to sepsis, the body’s life-threatening response to 
infection”, these conditions are considered critical and require immediate hospitalization (CDC, 
2016).  
According to the World Health Organization, there are four types of influenza viruses: 
types A, B, C and D. Influenza A viruses infect humans and many different animals. Influenza B 
viruses circulate among humans and cause seasonal epidemics. Seasonal influenza is expected 
and therefore healthcare systems can prepare for such events. During a typical year of seasonal 
flu, anywhere from 10-20% of the U.S. population becomes infected with the influenza virus, 
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hospitalizing on average between 200,000 and 700,000 people. Recent data collected from 47 
countries show between 291,000 and 646,000 people worldwide die from seasonal influenza-
related respiratory illnesses each year, higher than a previous estimate of 250,000 to 500,000 
(CDC, 2017). This increase in mortality is being attributed to poorer nations experiencing greater 
flu-associated deaths related to a reduction in flu vaccination programs. Additionally, the 
influenza virus has affected the older population especially hard which create or exacerbate other 
health factors (e.g. heart disease, stroke, endocrine disorders, and those with a weakened immune 
system due to disease or medications) (CDC, 2017). 
Furthermore, the CDC reports several studies during the 2009 pandemic noted a high 
prevalence of obesity among persons with severe illness attributable to A(H1N1). One example 
provided by the CDC details a case-cohort study that illustrates, "among persons aged ≥20 years, 
hospitalization with illness attributable to laboratory-confirmed influenza A(H1N1) was 
associated with extreme obesity (body mass index [BMI] ≥40) even in the absence of other risk 
factors for severe illness (odds ratio [OR]: 4.7; 95% CI = 1.3–17.2) (94). Death was associated 
with both obesity, defined as BMI ≥30 (OR: 3.1; 95% CI = 1.5–6.6) and extreme obesity (OR: 
7.6; 95% CI = 2.1–27.9)" (CDC, 2017). Lastly, the 2009 pandemic highlighted racial and ethnic 
disparities. Reports state this might be attributable to specific groups having higher prevalence of 
underlying medical conditions, barriers to health care access, and delayed receipt of antivirals 
(CDC, 2017). 
The emergence of a new and substantially different influenza A virus is most concerning 
due to its ability infect people and have sustained human to human transmission. An influenza 
pandemic occurs when a novel influenza virus emerges that can infect and be efficiently 
transmitted among individuals because of lack of pre-existing immunity in the population (HHS, 
2017). During a flu pandemic, we see infection rates double and in some cases even triple. The 
attack rate (i.e. gross clinical attack rate) refers to the percentage of the population that becomes 
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clinically ill due to pandemic influenza. The U.S. Census Bureau reports the current population is 
approximately 325.7 million people (U.S. Census, 2017). If the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services is correct in estimating pandemic influenza clinical disease attack rate of 20% to 
30%, then nearly 97.5 million people in the United States could develop the disease. The federal 
Pandemic Influenza Plan report shows of those who become ill, up to 50% will seek outpatient 
medical care (HHS, 2017). Using these calculations to estimate disease burden, the United States 
can expect between 32 and 48 million people in need of outpatient medical care; between 800,000 
to 11.5 million people needing to be hospitalized; and between 160,000 to 3.5 million people 
requiring ICU care (depending on severity-moderate (1958/68-like) to very severe (1918-like)) 
(Reed et al., 2013). An outbreak of this magnitude can cripple hospital infrastructure and disrupt 
national operations such as transportation and public safety due to widespread illness, 
absenteeism, and death, as well as public concern about exposure to the virus (HHS, 2017). 
Historical Context 
Over the past one hundred years, there have been four influenza pandemics: the 1918 
Spanish flu, 1957 Asian flu, the 1968 Hong Kong flu, and most recently, the 2009 H1N1 outbreak 
(debatably known as the “swine flu”). The most virulent strain of influenza A(H1N1) occurred in 
1918 during World War I killing close to 100 million people worldwide. Influenza (H2N2) 
appeared in China in 1957, killing nearly 2 million people; in 1968, influenza pandemic (H3N2) 
significantly impacted Hong Kong and killed between 500,000 to 2 million people worldwide. 
The most recent influenza pandemic occurred less than ten years ago. Influenza A(H1N1) first 
appeared in Mexico during early spring of 2009 lasting until mid-August 2010 killing over 
575,000 people (summary provided in table 1) (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2017).  
According to Dr. Ali Khan, author of “The Next Pandemic: On the Front Lines Against 
Humankind's Gravest Dangers,” If a flu pandemic occurred today on the same scale as the 1918 
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Spanish flu outbreak, with the current population being almost four times larger, the United States 
could expect to have close to 2 million people dead"(Khan, 2016). Globally, with the current 
(2018) total population standing at 7.8 billion (World Population Clock, 2018), it is estimated that 
anywhere between 75 and 370 million people worldwide could die. The thought of an outbreak 
on a scale of this degree is terrifying, but understanding the circumstances surrounding each 
pandemic outbreak provides imperative guidance for preparing, planning, responding to, and 
mitigating the next pandemic. 
Table 1. Summary of influenza pandemics key characteristics from the past one hundred years. 
Description Year   Strain    Suspected Origin    Approximate deaths       Pandemic  
“Spanish flu” 1918-1920     H1N1  China          50-100 million      Major 
“Asian flu” 1957-1958     H2N2  China           1-2 million       Severe 
“Hong Kong flu”        1968-1970     H3N2  China          500,000-2 million          Moderate 
“Swine flu”                 2009-2010     H1N1  Mexico           575,000       Moderate 
 
Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
 
 The 1918- “Spanish flu” outbreak is one of the most notorious pandemics on record. The 
virus was first identified in military personnel during World War I. This particular virulent strain 
of influenza quickly spread across nations simultaneously affecting North America, Europe, and 
Asia. During the peak of the pandemic, US Naval Hospitals were vigorously trying to combat the 
virus but were quickly overwhelmed. They were forced to rely on quarantine or infectious disease 
stations to contain the outbreak and relied on doctors, hospital corpsmen, and nurses to care for 
the daily needs of the patients (Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC), 2015). The 
NHHC provides records of real-life accounts from several navy medical professionals who 
treated patients around the country. 
 One recorded statement came from Navy nurse Josie Brown stationed in Great Lakes, 
Illinois. She described seeing “morgues packed to almost the ceiling with bodies stacked one on 
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top of another. The morticians worked day and night." She later detailed soldiers dying so quickly 
that, "We didn't have the time to treat them. We didn't take temperatures; we didn't even have 
time to take blood pressure". Records from the Navy Department Library chronicle a total of 
121,225 Navy and Marine patients were admitted to Navy medical facilities, of which, 4,158 died 
from complications of the virus, totaling more deaths than actual war-related fatalities (NHHC, 
2015). A historical analysis of the 1918-1919 "Spanish flu" illustrated the pandemic had death 
rates 5-20 times higher than expected (Taubenberger and Morens, 2006). 
 Ninety-one years later the influenza A (H1N1) virus would emerge in North America 
once again. Uniquely, this specific strain contained a combination of genes not previously 
identified in animals or people (CDC, 2017). Concerns quickly arose in April 2009, as numerous 
ILI cases were being reported in Mexico and several U.S. states, as well as several countries 
including the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany, the Netherlands, and Israel. As the virus became 
geographically widespread hospitals around the world were on alert, preparing and prepping for 
the intense impact that was to come. Unfortunately, after action records collected from several 
healthcare organizations throughout the U.S. exemplify public health and healthcare 
organizations were ill-equipped to handle the extent of cases they saw. The demand for supplies, 
space, and staff showcased the limited availability of necessary resources (Nebraska Medicine, 
2010; Wisconsin Division of Public Health, 2010; Maine CDC, 2010; Texas Department of State 
Health Services, 2010; Prima County Arizona, 2010; North Carolina Public Health Agency, 
2010). 
During the beginning stages of the outbreak, Domínguez-Cherit et al., conducted an 
observational study of 899 ILI hospitalized patients in Mexico. Of which, 58 of those patients 
presented critical illness such as severe acute respiratory distress syndrome. One section of the 
study describes the immense burden of H1N1 on emergency departments (ED) and intensive care 
units (ICU). The report determined as a result of increased patient volumes, numerous patients 
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experienced delays ICU admission. The sudden increase of patients and delay in admissions 
caused four patients to die while waiting in the ED (3 within 8 hours and 1 within 24 hours of 
arrival). The study further annotated, during the course of hospitalization, all but two critically ill 
patients required mechanical ventilation (48 invasive, 22 noninvasive, 16 both). The report 
resolved, “The usual capacity to care for critically ill patients was exceeded, necessitating care in 
other patient care areas and the addition of ICU beds and ventilators on 2 occasions” 
(Domínguez-Cherit et al., 2009). The study outlined median length of ICU stays to be 13.5 days 
for survivors and 7 days for non-survivors. Duration of ventilation was 15 and 7.5 days 
respectively. Within 4 to 14 days, 83% of critically ill patients died while in the ICU.  
An additional study conducted by Reed et al., demonstrates the reported cases of 
laboratory-confirmed influenza A (H1N1) is likely a significant underestimation of the total 
number of actual illnesses that occurred in during the 2009 pandemic. Their study calculations 
determine that through July 2009, 1.8 million to 5.7 million symptomatic cases of pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 occurred in the United States, resulting in 9,000–21,000 hospitalizations. These 
results further assume that the number of deaths was underreported to the same extent, and 
estimate the total number of individuals infected with the H1N1 virus in the United States during 
April–July 2009 "may have been up to 140× greater than the reported number of laboratory-
confirmed cases" (Reed et al., 2009). 
The US government pandemic response to the H1N1 outbreak was almost immediate.  In 
late April, under the rules of the International Health Regulations (IHR), the Director-General of 
the WHO declared the 2009 H1N1 outbreak a “Public Health Emergency of International 
Concern” (CDC, 2017). Recommendations included countries “intensify surveillance for unusual 
outbreaks of ILI and severe pneumonia”. After the IHR declaration, the US government 
determined H1N1 was a nationwide public health emergency. Soon after, the CDC released 25% 
of their Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), allocating supplies based on state population. Reports 
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indicate, “11 million treatments of antiviral drugs, and PPE including over 39 million respiratory 
protection devices (masks and respirators), gowns, gloves and face shields” were delivered to 
states all over the U.S. (CDC, 2010). 
Experts from HHS looked at surge capacity and capability and the impact pandemics 
have on the healthcare system. They determined initial emergency preparedness efforts need to 
include procuring essential staff, space (hospital infrastructure, alternate care sites), and supplies 
(personal protective equipment (PPE), such as N95 masks, influenza testing kits (nasal swabs), 
vaccines, ventilators, beds, etc.) (HHS, 2017). The Department of Health and Human Services 
defines surge capacity as a “health care system’s ability to meet an increased demand for medical 
care that challenges or exceeds normal operating capacity”. Medical surge capability refers to the 
ability to manage patients requiring unusual or very specialized medical evaluation and 
care. Additionally, surge capability includes, “the ability to treat patient problems that require 
special intervention to protect medical providers, other patients, and the integrity of the healthcare 
organization” (HHS, 2012).  
Disease Modeling Tools 
 Using disease modeling as tools to strengthen influenza surveillance and preparedness 
has become increasingly popular over the last few decades. Since the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, 
disease modeling tools have evolved to not only estimate disease burden to monitor 
epidemiologic trends, but to plan and allocate resources, promote vaccination, project influenza-
related hospitalization and mortality rates, and estimate influenza-related outpatient medical visits 
and symptomatic illness in the community (Rolfes et al., 2017). Gambhir et al., state, "the rising 
importance of infectious disease modeling makes this an appropriate time for a guide for public 
health practitioners tasked with preparing for, and responding to, an influenza pandemic" 
(Gambhir et al., 2015). A statement by Greenhalgh and Day explain that "compartmental models 
of infectious-disease transmission have proven to be an invaluable tool for the prediction of 
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disease progression and the evaluation of public health policies and interventions" (Greenhalgh 
and Day, 2017). 
Gambhir et al., elaborate by reporting during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, traditional 
methods of epidemiological methods were enhanced by computational techniques such as disease 
modeling. The article further explains that there are limited published studies that attempt to bring 
together questions being asked by public health officials and infectious disease modeling methods 
that can be used to address questions such as: what is the case-fatality ratio? What is the case-
hospitalization ratio? When will the disease incidence reach its peak? Who in the population 
should be prioritized for vaccination or antiviral treatment? How transmissible is the disease? and 
what is the basic reproduction number (R0)? (Gambhir et al., 2015). Greenhalgh, Day, and 
Gambhir et al., agree that modeling is a complementary activity and is not a substitute for other 
analyses. The idea behind disease modeling is to strengthen current methods and better serve 
public health and healthcare pandemic preparedness and response plans (Gambhir et al., 2015; 
Greenhalgh and Day, 2017). 
 The disease modeling tool for this project provides hospital administrators and public 
health officials' estimates of hospital-based services in demand during pandemic influenza surge 
events. The projections from this model estimate varying hospital variables that have effects on 
healthcare and health outcomes. The CDC introduced pandemic modeling tool FluSurge 1.0 in 
July 2004 which estimated the number and duration of influenza-related hospitalizations. 
Improvements and updates to this model have been released which now incorporate planning for 
influenza burden on a community, lab surge for specimen testing, work loss, and assisting state 
and local level planners by providing estimates of potential impact specific to their locality (CDC, 
2015). 
These types of models have been used in the National Pandemic Strategy for global, 
federal, state and local resource planning. The CDC also details these models now allow users to 
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change variables that impact estimates of the number of duration of influenza-related 
hospitalization, assumed average length of hospital stay and the percentage of hospitalizations 
that will require a stay in the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). These updated tools were created to 
make variables flexible due to the unpredictability of influenza, and to be used as a starting point 
for pandemic planning (CDC, 2015). The WHO and HHS have incorporated disease modeling 
tools to coordinate and improve efforts to effectively respond to influenza viruses with pandemic 
potential. The WHO details using modeling data to aid in decision-making, especially in 
vaccination production and distribution. 
Surge Capacity and Capabilities 
Dr. John Hick was one the first individuals to begin focusing on the complex aspects of 
surge capacity and capability (Kearns, Cairns, and Cairns, 2014). Events such as the H5N1 
outbreak led Hick et al., to begin focusing on how to leverage staff, equipment, and treatment 
areas to ensure vital resources would be available for critically ill patients during medical surge 
operations (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality [AHRQ], 2012). The Hick et.al article 
recommends, "examining surge capacity primarily in the context of responses within the 
hospital's physical structure or on its grounds that are managed and staffed by the hospital (i.e., do 
not rely on outside supplies or assistance)" (Hick et al., 2009). Hospitals should focus on being 
self-reliant as many resources may not be available from local healthcare organizations as they 
may not be in a position to assist others. A pandemic will likely affect several, if not all hospitals 
in the localized area, therefore, supply and demand for essential materials will be a challenge for 
all healthcare systems. 
During novel influenza outbreaks (where disease burden estimates are significantly 
lower) routine clinical operations are running at 95-100% capacity (Lawler, 2018). Recent flu 
season reports detail hospitals reaching capacity limits and having no room for a surge in patients 
in the emergency room or inpatient care clinics.  If a severe influenza outbreak were to happen 
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tomorrow, healthcare facilities and public health organizations would become severely stressed 
and ill-prepared to care for an influx of patients. 
In the U.S., critical care workgroups recommend preparing for surge capacity of 200% 
over usual critical care capacity (Hick et al., 2008). Because emergency departments (ED's) are 
considered frontline services for patients entering the healthcare system, ED's see the most 
patients per day during everyday operations than any other department or healthcare facility 
(Hick, et al., 2008). Due to the ED's frequency of emergent care cases, the department is often 
overwhelmed by patient surge during infectious disease outbreaks. Sugerman et al., conducted a 
survey of 26 emergency departments in Atlanta during the peak (July-October 2009) of H1N1. 
Because ED surge causes extensive overcrowding without adequate physical space or personnel, 
the central elements of this study was of ED surge capacity to include; space (e.g., number of 
beds and physical size of the ED), staffing systems (e.g., admitting process, clinical information 
systems, and ancillary services), and supply-demand (Sugerman et al., 2011). For the duration of 
the study participating ED reports show the mean monthly ILI visits more than tripled during the 
H1N1 outbreak. Of the 26 hospitals surveyed, 58% were forced to call in extra staff, 65% report 
having physical space limitations, and 64% show having to revise triage plans to improve 
capacity to respond to patient surge (Sugerman et al,. 2011). Further results identified the length 
of patient stay increased by 58% (15 days) and the number of patients leaving without being seen 
by a provider increased by 54%. After the study concluded, Sugerman et al., report that "despite 
implemented influenza plans, the increased demand for ED care outstripped space and supplies." 
One facility that was contacted after the survey went on record stating, ‘‘we should have had a 
plan in place sooner and drilled that plan'' (Sugerman et al., 2011). 
Kearns et al., describe that during pandemics, hospitals should include characteristics of 
“contingency surge capacity,” this includes; relying on space that is not typically used for 
emergent patients (e.g. conference rooms, fitness centers, medical offices). Kapur adds, 
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designated alternative sites of care for an increased number of patients consist of what he deems 
"flat spaces" this includes lobbies, waiting rooms, stadiums, or mobile units to accommodate the 
evaluation and treatment of surge patients (Kapur 2012). The Kearns study compiled with 
Kapur's statements demonstrate the need to identify facility space capabilities for patients, 
personnel, and supplies during large-scale infectious disease outbreaks (Kearns, Cairns, and 
Cairns, 2014). Addressing this issue entails identifying local areas that may also be used as 
"alternative care sites", these sites can include, (but should not be dependent on) ambulatory care 
facilities, local shelters (via Emergency Support Functions (ESF) 6 and 8), and nursing homes.   
Supplies 
Research conducted by Kearns et al., explain the pandemic of 2009 highlighted a gap 
between the equipment and supplies available versus what was needed as well as adequate 
policies and processes being in place to aid in this decision-making process (Kearns, Cairns, and 
Cairns, 2014). The Institute of Medicine (IOM) declares "the better prepared the institution and 
the more resources available, the longer a facility can stay in conventional and contingency mode 
before the shift to crisis standards of care becomes necessary, when the threat of morbidity and 
mortality to patients becomes significant as a result of the lack of resources" (IOM, 2017). Even a 
slight disruption to services and normal operational functions could have distressing 
consequences. Research articles regarding healthcare resources (e.g. medical supplies (PPE), 
equipment, and personnel) demonstrates critical supplies were exhausted within a matter of two 
to three weeks during a moderate to severe pandemic event. 
Like most concerned hospitals, stockpiling supplies and equipment became an intricate 
part of emergency plans. An issue that quickly arose was that "storage of supplies proved to be 
among the most resource-intensive components of cache-building" (Radonovich et al., 2009). 
Some medical supplies also have a short shelf life (expiration date), so purchasing a large number 
of items (which is often times expensive) is not a feasible option for a majority of hospitals. 
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Radonovich et al., elaborate by stating, "Stored items would also need to be inspected regularly 
and rotated through the storage facility on a regular basis" (Radonovich et al., 2009). A suggested 
solution for this problem is to hire a full-time employee to handle logistics management of the 
inventory. While this solution is good in theory, the issue of staffing and cost remains a 
significant limitation to such an idea. Furthermore, affirming PPE shortage predictions will 
prepare institutions in calculating supply needs, including what, when, and how much should be 
purchased according to recorded disease burden and the rate at which (i.e. how quickly) supplies 
are being used and disposed of.  Previous outbreaks of infectious disease proved to cripple the 
supply-demand within 2 weeks. If we look at usage rates of essential materials during a 
pandemic, reports show critical supplies being used at 40-50 times the normal rate. If during the 
next pandemic hospitals are using supplies at this high of a rate, it will be impossible to keep up 
with supply and demand that is needed for pandemic surge (Lawler, 2018). 
Staffing 
Hospital equipment and supplies are only useful if there are suitable health-care 
personnel to provide patient services and care. It has been estimated that only 10 to 20 percent of 
all medical personnel would be available at any given time for surge capacity (Ajao et al., 2015). 
This number significantly declines due to the shortfall of adequately trained staff capable of 
treating infectious disease outbreaks. Nebraska Medicine acknowledges the issue of providers not 
being confident in their skills to adequately take care of infectious patients. Considering this 
issue, when hospitals have provider shortages, nurses and doctors may be asked to work extended 
shifts and to work more frequently to compensate for worker absenteeism and lack of trained 
staff. 
Many experts agree that America’s healthcare system is only as strong as its employees. 
Pandemic influenza would test this principle and severely challenge the healthcare workforce. 
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) reports, during an influenza 
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pandemic, as many as 40 percent of the workforce would not show up to work. Employees could 
be absent due to being sick themselves, caring for sick family members, school and daycare 
closures, or fear of coming to work (OSHA, 2010). Levin, Gebbie, and Qureshi conducted a 
survey of more than 6,400 health-care workers in 47 facilities in the New York metropolitan 
region which asked the question would they be willing to report to work during a SARS outbreak. 
Only 48.4% stated they would show up to work.  
Balicer et al., administered a similar anonymous survey from January-March 2009, to 
Johns Hopkins Hospital employees asking about attitudes/beliefs toward emergency response. Of 
the 3426 respondents, one-in-four or 28% of hospital workers indicated they were not willing to 
respond to an influenza pandemic scenario if asked but not required to do so, and only an 
additional 10% were willing to respond if required by their employer (Balicer et al., 2010). The 
Executive Director of Emergency Management & Bio preparedness at Nebraska Medicine states 
that providers are not required to work during a pandemic and high absenteeism rates are 
expected, especially if the disease has a high fatality rate. 
Infectious disease outbreaks are particularly daunting. The biggest factor for staff 
unwillingness to respond was described as fears for personal and family safety; particularly their 
children (Levin, Gebbie and Qureshi 2007; Balicer et al., 2010). Because patient surge quickly 
runs through supplies, hospital staff express concerns of not feeling adequately protected and 
envisioning falling ill themselves and eventually infecting family and friends. Statements 
regarding worker safety show staff greatly value the provision of adequate PPE and clear, repeat 
training and routines to protect themselves. Kearns et al., states that staffing issues surrounding 
pandemics may call for clinicians with “traditional credentials” such as dermatologists, 
ophthalmologists, psychiatrists, pathologists; or nursing staff that now work in administration or 
serve outside of the traditional clinical setting who may not be accustomed to managing acutely 
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ill or critically injured patients, to now taking unconventional roles and expanding their scopes of 
practices for patient treatment and care (Kearns et al., 2014).  
Previous pandemic reports showcase the need to delegate care, duties, and 
responsibilities. The delegation of care and services may include staff members leveraging just-
in-time (JIT) training to efficiently care for patients. Nebraska Medicine's support services and 
human resource team have considered the option of mapping out essential services that could 
possibly be delegated (with supervision) to other personnel as well as medical and healthcare 
students currently attending UNMC (based on current year and field of study, and 
credentials/certifications) to meet clinical demands. Some duties may include basic initial patient 
assessment (height, weight, temperature, recording symptoms, etc.), to more complex services 
such as manual patient ventilation (handheld resuscitation device, e.g. Ambu, VentiSure, etc.) if 
mechanical ventilation is not available or feasible. It is important to note that these suggestions 
are only being considered in the event of a pandemic due to legal aspects and concerns. This is all 
in attempt to provide the greatest good for the greatest number of people. 
Pandemic planning should also consider non-clinical hospital staff that are critical to the 
operation such as cooks, facilities and equipment technicians, and security staff. Hospitals rely on 
several service departments to aid in the continuing operations of care. Patients, families, and 
staff need to be fed, equipment and hospital rooms require maintenance, and the security of 
hospital infrastructure, patients, staff, equipment, and supplies must be secured. Staffing issues 
are not just restricted to hospital personnel. In order to keep hospitals and healthcare clinics 
operational, outside companies who manufacture and deliver essential products are also affected 
by a pandemic. For example, the healthcare system depends on external sources to produce linen, 
PPE, and specimen kits, food manufacturers, sanitation and waste management, as well as 
transport companies to distribute necessary supplies. 
27 
 
HHS describes an influenza pandemic will cause the supply chain to become vulnerable 
and hospitals will begin to see shortages of essential goods (e.g. food water, medicines, PPE, 
etc.), as a result of decreased production, reduced international and national transport, and missed 
deliveries due to absenteeism (HHS, 2017). While healthcare organizations may consider all 
personnel essential, it will be difficult to address the issue of work loss of external services. 
Nebraska Medicine addresses this challenge by establishing strong relationships early on with 
local vendors and supply distributors (e.g. Cardinal Health, Nebraska Sysco, Sodexo, etc.) but 
admit they are reliant on contracts and good faith that staff will show up and critical resources 
will be supplied.  
Space 
A study on Emergency Department facility design for mass-casualty incidents conducted 
by Hicks et al. demonstrated that physical space for supplies, equipment, and patient surge is one 
of the most intricate areas of pandemic planning. This issue is described as hospitals having a 
difficult time with space creation and flexibility, leaving little reserve space available during 
pandemic surge (Hick et al., 2009). Research on hospitals and insufficient space detail that if 
hospitals were being built today, the design and layout would look very much different; they 
would now consider patient surge operations in their initial design to be more functional and 
practical, allowing for better patient flow and processes of care. Hick et al., states, "As hospitals 
remodel or expand, construction of spaces as "dual purpose" is critical". He later admits, "most 
federal grant (including the Hospital Preparedness Program) funding typically restricts funding 
for new construction", but points out that low-cost modifications can "often be integrated into 
new projects, provided that there is early and consistent advocacy for these changes from 
administration and project planners" (Hick et al., 2009). 
Because space is a critical concept of planning, experts suggest during times of pandemic 
and patient surge, hospitals understand the expansion/surge plans for their department and region, 
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including triaging of patients to other locations or the opening of other clinical areas for 
emergency care (Hick et al., 2012). Experts also describe utilizing the maximal use of facilities 
for patient overflow. This may include conversion of private rooms to semi-private, using other 
areas of a hospital (Post Anesthesia Care Unit [PACU], lobbies, hallways, parking lots, 
classrooms), and accessing other healthcare organizations such as the American Red Cross, 
Medical Reserve Corps, and local health care coalitions (Hick et al., 2012). In other cases, some 
reports demonstrate adequate space (including size) but lacking vital items in that space. A few 
accounts detail not having HEPA filters or proper ventilation; insufficient oxygen ports, complex 
room design/set up, leading to a diminished standard of care. Due to 20-50% of critically ill 
influenza patients requiring extensive support, Manuell et al., state, there are several critical 
requirements needed for a physical location to be used to provide ICU level critical care. These 
items include piped gas for ICU beds, adequate electricity, vacuum/suctioning capabilities, 
monitoring equipment, and sufficient physical space, given infection control parameters, for 
equipment and patient management (Manuell et al., 2011). 
Given these limitations and the known fact of pandemics lasting for several weeks to 
even months, these spaces would prove to be insufficient for prolonged treatment of patients (7-
14 days). Discussions surrounding hospital occupancy rates estimates that only 4-5% of hospital 
beds are available at any given moment (Lawler, 2018) and the fact remains the number of 
hospitals in the United States is swiftly diminishing, increasing the demands on already stressed 
healthcare organizations. Healthcare providers declare during a real-life pandemic event, 
hospitals would have to be placed on lockdown to control the surge of patients due to space 
constraints and hospital regulations. 
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Chapter 3: METHODS 
Data Collection 
Starting at the beginning of April 2017, the pandemic planning process included planning 
committees meticulously examining the 2008 Pandemic Plan and appendices. The focus was to 
identify gaps in previous response objectives and activities and update the 2008 plan to reflect 
recent literature information and what experts in the preparedness field are currently suggesting. 
An extensive literature review was conducted over a 12 month period to obtain the most recent 
reports on lessons learned from previous pandemic response plans, disease burden of infectious 
diseases, disease modeling, and decision support tools for pandemic preparedness. This thesis 
synthesizes the reviewed literature and provides specific, independent calculations and estimates 
for potential pandemic influenza disease burden in Douglas County Nebraska and on Nebraska 
Medicine's healthcare services. The results from this thesis will provide the basis for the 2018 
Pandemic Preparedness Plan, and assisting planning committees and hospital departments with 
pandemic surge projections in order to aid in the decision-making process for scarce resources in 
the event of a pandemic. 
2017-2018 Pandemic Committee  
Nebraska Medicine identified eight pandemic influenza committees; 1) Triage and Crisis 
Standards of Care and Clinical Staffing Locations and Strategies 2) Palliative Care 3) Support 
Services (EVS, patient care equipment, HR, food services, morgue surge, security, risk 
management, facilities, linen) 4) UNMC Research 5)UNMC Education 6) Infection Prevention 
and Medical Countermeasures (pharmacy, employee health, DCHD) 7) Communications (PIO, 
call center) and 8) Behavioral Health and Support. Committees are comprised of physicians, 
physician’s assistants, nurses, specialist in their dedicated field, and trained and qualified UNMC 
student pandemic influenza volunteers. For this project, triage and crisis standards of care, 
clinical staffing, and support services were the specific committees worked with to obtain 
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pertinent data for this thesis. Several committee meetings transpired as well as personal one on 
one discussions with committee team leads to obtain information needed for disease burden 
projections on patient surge, staffing, and supplies. 
To determine Nebraska Medicine's current capacity and capabilities, hospital-wide 
inventory of essential supplies (N95 masks, surgical masks, eyewear, gloves, gowns, needles and 
syringes, RT circuits, sanitizers, flu kits, and substitute items), and equipment needs (ICU and 
ventilator capabilities and individual hospital unit bed counts) was collected from the triage and 
crisis standards of care team, and the supply service committee. Information on the supply "watch 
list" includes item identification number and description, quantity on hand, allocation reports, the 
quantity of the item ordered, and quantity received, and manufacturer listing). Data on total max 
capacity hospital beds, ICU beds, current census and capacity, and occupancy percentage, was 
obtained from Nebraska Medicine's Daily Census Staffing Report shown in Table 2. 
Table 2: Daily Census Staffing Report (as of 1/31/18) 
Area 
Max 
Possible 
Capacity 
Current 
Census 
Anticipated 
D/C 
Held 
Beds Transfers 
Current 
Capacity 
Occupancy 
Percentage 
ICU Beds 
72 67 2 0 15 72 93% 
M/S Beds  
441 414 86 5 3 436 95% 
TNMC Total 
590 513 90 8 18 582 88% 
TNMC Med/Surg, 
Tele, ICU Total 
513 481 88 5 18 508 95% 
 
ICU capacity was gathered from hospital administrator reports showing average annual 
patient admission into the unit. Morgue capacity was also included in this data. Current data 
illustrates that at any given time, morgue space allows for a maximum of 64 deceased. This 
number includes all current available spaces, so it is noted that this number will fluctuate 
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depending on occupancy by non-pandemic related deaths. Before planning projections could 
begin monthly meetings with all committee members and a tabletop exercise was conducted to 
cross-reference each committee's plan to make sure all pandemic planning activities coincided 
with one another's before being included in project projections. 
Staffing listings (i.e. pandemic planning headcount) included: staff name, job title, 
department, function, position level, status description, location, and title of all hospital and 
support staff (e.g. adjunct faculty, administrative staff, ambulatory services, college professors, 
security, nursing staff, supply manufacturers, EVS, physicians, etc.). This information was 
retrieved from clinical staffing locations and strategies committee and Nebraska Medicine’s 
human resources operations. During a pandemic period, Nebraska Medicine considers all hospital 
personnel essential and expects all its workforce to respond to work if called upon. Therefore, 
information was collected on all current employed Nebraska Medicine and UNMC medical 
staff.  As previously noted, hospital infrastructure is a complex area to plan for. Due to space and 
availability constraints, each department identified current location capacity and previous surge 
plan operations. 
Epidemiologic Measures 
Considering the differing levels of influenza severity, an extensive review of historical 
pandemic influenza literature and data was collected from the past four influenza pandemics 
(1918, 1957, 1968, and 2009). Epidemiologic characteristics of influenza such as transmissibility 
of the infection in the population (low, moderate, high), clinical severity and duration of the virus, 
and gross attack rate were identified and used for a pandemic influenza scenario throughout the 
state of Nebraska and Douglas County Nebraska. Because Nebraska Medicine is located in 
Douglas County, the county was purposefully selected in order to calculate a more precise 
estimate of disease burden on Nebraska Medicine’s staff, space, and essential supplies. 
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Data collection from previous pandemic influenza investigations and studies included 
analysis of case fatality rates, symptomatic case-hospitalization ratio, and the ratio of deaths to 
hospitalizations. This information collected was used to develop the basis of clinical severity for 
this project. Measures of transmissibility included secondary and clinical attack rates, an 
estimated R0, and peak hospital visits due to ILI. An important transmissibility parameter for 
infectious disease models tends to be R0 (pronounced “R naught”), i.e. basic reproductive 
number. The R0 illustrates the average number of new infections that would result from the 
introduction of an infectious person into a susceptible population. Because the current threat of 
influenza virus H7N9 has not yet been shown to be human-to-human transmittable, the 
calculations in this thesis used epidemiological characteristics from the 1918 H1N1 virus to 
identify the most severe case scenario and characteristics from the 1958/1968 (H2N2/H3N2) to 
demonstrate a moderate case scenario. The median R0 of 2.0 from the 1918 pandemic and the 
median R0 of 1.65 from the 1957 pandemic were used for this project to obtain sustained human 
transmittable scenario estimates (Biggerstaff et al., 2014).  
The value of R characterizes the final number infected in the absence of an intervention 
(Biggerstaff, 2014). If R0 <1 each existing infection causes less than one new infection. In this 
case, the disease will decline and eventually die out. If R0 equals 1, each existing infection causes 
one new infection. This illustrates the disease will stay alive and stable, but an outbreak or an 
epidemic will not occur. If R0 > 1 this demonstrates each existing infection causes more than one 
new infection, showcasing the disease will spread between people and the likelihood that an 
outbreak will occur. The simulation model chosen for this thesis allows for model estimates (e.g. 
R0, CFR, attack rates, etc.) to be changed according to current pandemic data and information 
once the virus has sustained human-to-human transmission. 
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Pandemic Modeling Tools  
Disease modeling tool FluAid 2.0 was used to provide an estimate of impact in terms of 
deaths, hospitalizations, and outpatient visits due to pandemic influenza (CDC, 2016). Data 
estimates provided in FluAid 2.0 was then transferred to Microsoft Excel to build FluSurge 2.0 
projections. For the scope of this thesis, these tools were used to estimate the potential impact and 
disease burden of pandemic influenza on critical resources at Nebraska Medicine. FluAid and 
FluSurge 2.0 were used to calculate the percentage of hospital capacity needed, demand on 
hospital-based resources such as hospital beds, ventilators, ICU capabilities, and potential health 
outcomes (e.g. morbidity and mortality rates) associated with the next influenza pandemic. Both 
pandemic modeling tools were used to provide estimates intended to answer questions such as: 
Will there be sufficient hospital beds? Will there be enough health care providers to deal with the 
estimated number of outpatients? (CDC, 2016).  
For this thesis, planning projections for demand on hospital-based resources during a 
pandemic, such as: average length of non-ICU hospital stay; average length of ICU stay; average 
length of ventilator usage; average proportion of admitted influenza patients that will need ICU 
care; average proportion of admitted influenza patients that will need ventilators; and average 
proportion of influenza deaths assumed to be hospitalized for influenza-related illness, were 
gathered from the CDC national average report on FluSurge 2.0 software. Daily percentage 
increase in cases arriving compared to previous day was calculated by using CDC pandemic tool: 
FluAid 2.0 software, in order to provide guidance on current and future pandemic development 
plans and improvement to preparedness tools that can aid public health practitioners in the event 
of an influenza pandemic. 
FluSurge 2.0 requires a list of inputs and primary data. Users are asked to provide 
estimates of their local population in 3 age groups (0–19, 20–64, and 65+ years).  Data on the 
Douglas County Nebraska population were obtained from the 2017 United States Census Bureau. 
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Age distribution provided by the Census was outlined in 4 and 9-year groupings.  In order for an 
even distribution of data to allow for calculations with the FluSurge program, I used the 
default age groups set into FluSurge, (0– 19 years, 20–64 years, and 65+ years) (shown in 
table 5). Total hospital resources (total non-ICU hospital beds, total ICU beds, and total 
mechanical ventilators), and general hospital information can be collected from hospital 
administrators, department coordinators, and human resources. All projections were calculated 
using the Douglas County Nebraska population. Given that Nebraska Medicine is one of the 
largest hospitals in the state, the projected data may be significantly lower if residents living 
outside of the county travel to receive treatment at our facility.   
The CDC reports during a pandemic, infection in a localized area can last about six to 
eight weeks, and a least two pandemic disease waves will occur. Once the primary data section is 
complete the user is then instructed to determine pandemic duration (duration refers to the 
number of weeks users assume the pandemic wave to last) of 6, 8, or 12 weeks, and pandemic 
attack rate (attack rate refers to the percentage of the population that becomes clinically ill due to 
an influenza pandemic) of either 15, 25, or 35%. FluSurge then calculates the data and provides 
estimates of hospital admissions and hospital (non-ICU), ICU, and ventilator capacity needed 
over the course of the pandemic (by week). FluSurge was also used to estimate the number of 
hospital admissions and deaths due to an influenza pandemic. Hospital admissions were estimated 
for 3 different pandemic impact scenarios: minimum or the best-case scenario (fewest possible 
number of hospital admissions); mean or the most likely scenario (number of hospital admissions 
most likely to occur); and maximum or the worst-case (1918-type) scenario (largest number of 
hospital admissions) (Zhang, 2006).  
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Chapter 4: RESULTS/PROJECTIONS 
Demographics 
Population estimates show Douglas County Nebraska currently has a total population of 
554,995 people. (Douglas County GIS, data set, 2017). Population in FluSurge is divided into 
three age groups: school-aged children, working adults, and retirees. Douglas County population 
was structured to fit FluSurge 2.0 age group parameters shown in Table 3. Table 3 illustrates total 
population and does not represent adjustments made for Nebraska Medicine’s market share of 
30%. The population was adjusted to reflect Nebraska Medicine’s current market share and is 
reflected in the final results. 
Table 3: Douglas County Nebraska population by age group, 2017 Census Data 
Age Group Total Population 
0-19 143,362 
20-64 344,175 
65 + 67,458 
*Population retrieved from the U.S. Census Bureau 
 Initial Assessment 
 Because influenza creates a surge in demand for hospital-based services, the initial 
project assessment estimates the disease burden of influenza on outpatient medical care, 
hospitalization, ICU care, mechanical ventilation, and deaths for all of Douglas County Nebraska 
hospitals. First, the R0 of 1.65 from the moderate 1958/1968 pandemic was used to simulate a 
moderate pandemic in the state of Nebraska (shown in the second column of Table 4). To provide 
a severe pandemic influenza scenario epidemiological characteristics from the 1918 influenza 
virus (shown in the fourth column of table 4) were used. For both moderate and severe scenarios, 
the illness (i.e. attack rate) of 35% was used as the median rate from previous pandemic influenza 
estimates which range from 20% to 50%.  
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Table 4: Douglas County Nebraska Moderate and Severe Pandemic Influenza Scenario 
Number of Episodes of Illness, Healthcare Utilization, and Death Associated with Moderate and Severe Pandemic Influenza Scenarios (**Douglas 
County, Nebraska).Table 4 results include Douglas County’s total population. 
 
Results in Table 4 column 2 indicate that a moderate 1958/68 like pandemic in Douglas 
County Nebraska could cause the hospitalizations of over 1,800 people with more than 270 
requiring ICU care (136 of which would mechanical ventilation) and nearly 450 deaths. In the 
event of a severe 1918-like pandemic (Table 4 column 4), an excess of 194,000 would become ill 
with 11% (n= 21,371) of Douglas County's population needing to be hospitalized. Over 3,000 
would need ICU care, 1,600 requiring ventilators, with nearly 4,100 deaths.   
Nebraska Medicine Capacity and Capability 
The next step was to calculate pandemic disease burden for Nebraska Medicine. On 
average, Nebraska Medicine operates at 95-97% capacity. Based on these percentages, the 
numbers shown in Table 5 represent Nebraska Medicine running at normal capacity rates. These 
rates were chosen to reflect how pandemic influenza affects everyday hospital operations and its 
burden on critical resources. Information was collected on total licensed non-ICU beds, total 
licensed ICU beds, and a total number of ventilators to reflect Nebraska Medicine’s current 
capabilities. Reports collected from Nebraska Medicine (provided in Table 2) list a total of 441 
licensed non ICU beds, 72 licensed ICU beds, with 55 available ventilators. Current reports of 
Characteristics       Moderate (1958/68-like)    % of Illness        SEVERE (1918-like) % of Illness  
Total DC** Population  554,995               …     554,995      …  
Illness (35% attack rate)   194,248        …     194,248                   …  
Outpatient Medical Care     97,124     50%       97,124      50%  
Hospitalization        1,865   0.96%       21,371      11%  
ICU Care           272   0.14%         3,205      1.65%  
Mechanical Ventilation          136   0.07%         1,612   0.83%  
Deaths           447    0.23%         4,099    2.11% 
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ventilator use illustrate that at any given moment, 36 out of 55 ventilators are in use, leaving only 
33% of ventilators available for use in a pandemic.  
Table 5: Nebraska Medicine Current Capabilities 
 
Total licensed non-ICU beds 441 
% licensed non-ICU beds staffed: 5% 
Total staffed non-ICU beds: 221 
Total licensed ICU beds: 72 
% licensed ICU beds staffed: 7% 
Total staffed ICU beds: 36 
Total number of ventilators: 55 
% ventilators available: 33% 
Total number of ventilators available: 18 
 
Input assumptions for this project, demonstrated in Table 6, are based on national 
estimates (provided by FluSurge). National estimates (based on previous pandemics) assume that, 
on average, the length of non-ICU hospital stay for influenza-related illness is 5 days, the length 
of ICU stay for influenza-related illness is 10 days, and the length of ventilator usage for 
influenza-related illness is 10 days. Additionally, Table 6 illustrates the average proportion of 
admitted influenza patients that will need ICU care is 15%, and the average proportion of 
admitted influenza patients that will need ventilators is 7.5%. The model FluAid details the term 
"hospitalization" refers to, "those who are hospitalized due to influenza-related illness but who 
survive the illness (i.e., their end health outcome is hospitalization). However, a percentage of 
those who will die from pandemic influenza-related illnesses are likely to die while hospitalized. 
Thus, the total number of hospital beds required will be the sum of hospitalizations plus in-
hospital deaths. The estimates of total hospitalizations given in the HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan 
were calculated according to the assumption that 70% of influenza-related deaths will occur in 
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hospital (CDC, 2012). Furthermore, hospitals can also expect to see a 5% daily increase in cases 
arriving compared to preceding day before.   
Table 6: FluSurge2.0 Inputs and Assumptions that can be altered 
 Input assumptions Unit Values 
No. 1 Average length of non-ICU hospital stay for influenza-related illness Days 5 
No. 2 Average length of ICU stay for influenza-related illness days 10 
No. 3 Average length of ventilator usage for influenza-related illness days 10 
No. 4 Average proportion of admitted influenza patients will need ICU care proportion 15% 
No. 5 Average proportion of admitted influenza patients will need ventilators proportion 7.5% 
No. 6 Average proportion of influenza deaths assumed to be hospitalized proportion 70% 
No. 7 Daily percentage increase in cases arriving compared to previous day percent 5% 
*All values in Table 7 can be changed to reflect current data and/or specific locale information. 
FluSurge2.0 Results 
Results from FluSurge 2.0 contain projections based off of an influenza pandemic 
scenario with a 35% gross clinical attack rate and an 8-week duration. Table 7 demonstrates an 
influenza pandemic of this degree will most likely result in a total of 680 hospital admissions 
(ranging from 244 to 866), and 155 deaths (ranging from 87 to 259) at Nebraska Medicine. Table 
8 contains data regarding most likely, minimum, and maximum weekly hospital admissions over 
an 8 week period. Results show the peak number of hospital admissions arrived at the 4th and 5th 
week for all scenarios. The results (shown in Table 8 and illustrated in Figure 1) ranged from 46 
admissions in the minimum scenario to 165 admissions in the maximum scenario, with a total of 
129 patients admitted per week in the most likely scenario. 
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Table 7: Total Pan Flu Impact         Figure 1: Weekly Distribution of Hospital Admissions 
  
 
 
Table 8: Weekly hospital admissions over 8-week duration 
Hospital Admissions    WEEK 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Most Likely Scenario 
41 68 102 129 129 102 68 41 
Minimum Scenario 
15 24 37 46 46 37 24 15 
Maximum Scenario 
52 87 130 165 165 130 87 52 
*The estimated number of hospital admissions is based on death rates and hospitalization rates provided by FluAid2.0. 
Demand on Hospital Resources 
Table 9 presents results from the calculations using the data entered in FluAid2.0. It 
presents the estimates by specified pandemic duration (e.g., 8 weeks) and gross clinical attack 
rate (e.g., 35%), of the impact of pandemic influenza on Nebraska Medicine’s resources. 
FluSurge2.0 manual describes the hospital admission category includes the total number of 
weekly hospital admissions of influenza patients and peak admission per day. The hospital 
capacity category details the maximum total number of influenza patients in the hospital and 
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appropriate hospital capacity needed. ICU capacity indicates the maximum total number of 
influenza patients in the ICU, and pertinent ICU capacity needed. Ventilator capacity includes the 
maximum total number of ventilators used and related percentage of use. Related death estimates 
reflect total number of deaths and total number of influenza patients expected to die in the 
hospital due to influenza pandemic in a week (Zhang, 2005).  
Table 9: Results: Demand for hospital-based resources: 35% attack rate: 8 weeks duration 
Pandemic Influenza Impact 
Weeks 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Hospital 
Admission 
Weekly admissions 41 68 102 129 129 102 68 41 
Peak admissions/day       21 21       
Hospital 
Capacity 
# of influenza patients in 
hospital 31 51 76 97 102 85 65 43 
% of hospital capacity 
needed* 138% 231% 346% 438% 464% 386% 296% 194% 
ICU 
Capacity 
# of influenza patients in 
ICU 6 13 20 27 29 28 22 15 
% of ICU capacity 
needed* 121% 260% 399% 527% 575% 558% 434% 299% 
Ventilator 
Capacity 
# of influenza patients on 
ventilators 3 7 10 13 15 14 11 8 
% usage of ventilator 17% 36% 55% 73% 80% 77% 60% 41% 
Deaths 
# of deaths from 
influenza     9 16 23 29 29 23 
# of influenza deaths in 
hospital     7 11 16 21 21 16 
1. All results showed in this table are based on the most likely scenario. 
2. Number of influenza patients in hospital, in ICU, and number of influenza patients on ventilators are based on maximum daily number in a relevant 
week. 
3. Hospital capacity used, ICU capacity used, and % usage of ventilator is calculated as a percentage of total capacity available (see manual for details). 
4. The maximum number of influenza patients in the hospital each week is lower than the number of weekly admissions because we assume a 7-day stay 
in general wards. 
 
Table 9 illustrates the demand on hospital resources peak in week 5, with a maximum of 
464% of all hospital non-ICU beds, 575% of total ICU capacity, and 80% of all ventilators at 
Nebraska Medicine needed to respond to influenza cases presented at their hospital. Examples of 
the impact of changing hospital capacity are shown in Table 10. These results are based on 
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Nebraska Medicine’s current intervention plans being implemented during week one of a 
pandemic.  
Intervention 
The same demographics, characteristics, and assumptions were run in FluSurge2.0 again 
to reflect Nebraska Medicine operating at 80% (opposed to 95-97%) to demonstrate if Nebraska 
Medicine discharged 20% of its current patients to make room for incoming ILI patients (no other 
interventions were included in these calculations). Table 10 reflects the change in demand for 
hospital resources (non-ICU hospital beds, ICU beds) needed to respond to a pandemic event. 
Again, the demand on hospital resources peaked in week 5, with a maximum of 116% of all 
hospital non-ICU beds and 201% of total ICU capacity needed to respond to influenza cases at 
Nebraska Medicine. Ventilator capacity need remained at 80%. Deaths from influenza and 
influenza deaths in hospital also remained the same. 
Table 10: Results: Demand for hospital-based resources: 35% attack rate: 8 weeks duration 
Pandemic Influenza Impact 
Weeks 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Hospital 
Admission 
Weekly admissions 41 68 102 129 129 102 68 41 
Peak admissions/day       21 21       
Hospital 
Capacity 
# of influenza patients in 
hospital 31 51 76 97 102 85 65 43 
% of hospital capacity 
needed* 35% 58% 87% 110% 116% 97% 74% 48% 
ICU 
Capacity 
# of influenza patients in 
ICU 6 13 20 27 29 28 22 15 
% of ICU capacity 
needed* 43% 91% 140% 185% 201% 195% 152% 105% 
Ventilator 
Capacity 
# of influenza patients on 
ventilators 3 7 10 13 15 14 11 8 
% usage of ventilator 17% 36% 55% 73% 80% 77% 60% 41% 
Deaths 
# of deaths from 
influenza     9 16 23 29 29 23 
# of influenza deaths in 
hospital     7 11 16 21 21 16 
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Chapter 5: DISCUSSION 
 
When developing a pandemic plan, many hospitals often use a single scenario, but both 
disease modeling tools, FluAid and FluSurge 2.0, are flexible and have the ability to reflect 
several scenarios by altering variables such as gross attack rates, pandemic duration, case fatality 
rates, and hospital capability and capacity for any state, county, or city demographics. 
Demographics from the state of Nebraska and Douglas County Nebraska were independently 
collected and input into FluSurge 2.0 to run pandemic influenza scenarios for both areas. Due to 
the unpredictability of pandemic influenza, scenarios for gross attack rates of 15%, 25%, and 
35% were calculated and presented to Nebraska Medicine. This allows the hospital to prepare for 
events at wavering levels and showcases 3 different pandemic impact scenarios: minimum or the 
best-case scenario (fewest possible number of hospital admissions); mean or the most likely 
scenario (number of hospital admissions most likely to occur); and maximum or the worst-case 
(1918-type) scenario (largest number of hospital admissions). The CDC states, "for a given gross 
clinical attack rate, the extensive range between the minimum and maximum estimates is due to 
the uncertainty of how the next pandemic will spread through society, as well as to the lack of 
data regarding the impact of influenza in previous pandemics. Such uncertainty and the resultant 
wide ranges in estimated impact should serve as a warning to planners not to be overconfident in 
using a single estimate of impact when preparing their plans" (CDC, 2005). 
This thesis explores the potential impact, disruption of services, and disease burden 
facing Nebraska Medicine and their capability and capacity to handle surge events. Resource 
adequacy during surge events is influenced by a wide range of factors including but not limited 
to: community demographics, intervention measures, and pandemic severity. The results depicted 
in this thesis were based on Douglas County’s current population and adjusted in FluSurge to 
reflect Nebraska Medicine’s current market share of 30%. The cumulative market share is based 
on the number of inpatient days in each facility. All hospitals in the hospital referral region 
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belonging to the same system are grouped together as one institution. Due to Nebraska Medicine 
previous influenza market share showing percentages above 30%, market share rates should be 
adjusted for future calculations once the exact percentage is known. The increase in percentage is 
likely due to the number of patients living outside of Douglas County arriving to seek medical 
treatment at Nebraska Medicine. In this case hospital, administrators should reflect this in their 
analysis to lobby for more hospital resources, stockpiling items, vaccination dose, and antiviral 
treatments. 
Results from this study indicate that a moderate to severe influenza outbreak in Douglas 
County Nebraska would present considerable challenges and place extreme pressure on Nebraska 
Medicine’s capacity and capability to care for patients. It is important to note that some hospital 
capacity must always be reserved for patients other than those ill from infectious diseases (e.g., 
maternity, trauma, burn units, unless the hospital is designated to be a flu only hospital). If an 
influenza pandemic were to occur, Nebraska Medicine has elected to stop all elective cases, 
discharge non-emergent cases, and only admit life-threatening injuries and illness to open space 
for ILI patients. The CDC ethics subcommittee reports, even during an influenza pandemic, 
adequate healthcare can, and should be provided, and although hospitals will likely reach 
maximum supply and equipment capacity during a pandemic, ethical considerations and decisions 
regarding allocation of resources need to be made in the context of the incident (CDC, 2012). 
During an influenza pandemic, Nebraska Medicine outlines allocating ventilators based on the 
standardized method of assessing multi-organ function (and failure) using the Sequential Organ 
Failure Assessment (SOFA) score.  
Results shown in Table 6 demonstrate that because Nebraska Medicine presently operates 
at or close to full capacity, so meeting the needs experienced in a pandemic scenario would place 
a severe strain on the already stressed hospital. Projections included in Table 9 indicate that if 
Nebraska Medicine continues to work at 95-97% capacity, (with a 35% attack rate and an 8-week 
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duration) without strategic plans or interventions in place, hospital capacity and resources needed 
for the influx of ILI patients will double within the first couple of weeks. By week 5 (pandemic 
peak), Nebraska Medicine expressed vital supplies and resources will be on allocation. Nebraska 
Medicine’s support services define this as the process of distributing supply based on priorities; 
when supply is constrained by the demand of an entire allocation group it is addressed through 
"supply distribution rules". These rules define how to resolve supply constraints within an 
allocation group when the supply is limited.   
To evaluate hospital-resource adequacy at Nebraska Medicine disease modeling was 
useful as it has the ability to predict weekly patient admissions under a wide range of 
demographics, assumptions, and basic hospital capabilities. These results may be beneficial when 
appealing to public health officials, hospital administrators, and policymakers when 
demonstrating the demand for critical hospital services at the scale represented in this study 
during an influenza pandemic in Douglas County Nebraska. The information in this thesis was 
presented to Nebraska Medicine's Executive Director of Emergency Management & Bio 
preparedness and the eight pandemic planning committees to update Nebraska Medicine's 2018 
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan. 
After initial results were presented showing disease burden of pandemic influenza while 
operating at 95-97% capacity, each pandemic committee revised their plans to indicate 
preparedness activities, by week, in order to reduce the amount of current hospital capacity 
needed during an influenza pandemic. Pandemic actions included cancellation of elective 
procedures, routine admissions, and health maintenance visits; delay non-life-saving treatments 
for existing patients, limit incoming patient transfers, and encourage dismissal of immune-
compromised patients. Committee members relayed reducing these services by 20%. FluSurge 
was then run with the updated information and results are shown in Table 10. These new results 
allowed for each team to adjust planning activities based on calculations of percentage of capacity 
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needed in weeks 1 through 8. All final results with adjustments made to include previous 
intervention strategies will be presented at the upcoming meeting. Along with the updated 
projections, recommendations based on these results will also be included. 
Recommendations  
In the case that the above interventions do not decrease the intended percentage of hospital 
capacity, the plans to accommodate patient surge includes activities such as: evaluating the 
capacity for double occupancy rooms, placing primary care staff and providers on standby to be 
able to set up walk-in “flu clinics”, monitor inpatient bed capacity & hospital status twice daily, 
transfer unaffected patients to long-term care if possible, and triage patients and implement Crisis 
Standards of Care. Further recommendations presented to Nebraska Medicine include:  
• Create pandemic plans for week by week operations. Plans should range anywhere from 
8 weeks to 12 and consider pandemic waves  
• The unpredictability of pandemic influenza makes the accuracy of disease burden 
projections difficult, so it is important to periodically revise these projections to include 
current information regarding current hospital capacity and capabilities, hospital market 
share, and updated data as it becomes available as the pandemic is in progress 
• Inventory personal protective equipment on “watch list” and order additional supplies as 
identified 
• Consider stockpiling critical supplies such as N95 masks, gloves, gowns, and equipment 
(e.g. ventilators, ICU beds, cots, etc.) that allow the hospital to operate at 200% surge  
• Discuss with local and state health departments how bed availability, including available 
ICU beds and ventilators, will be tracked during a pandemic 
• List of available trained and qualified staff to operate additional ventilator(s) 
• Because critical supplies and equipment will be in extreme demand during a pandemic, it 
is recommended to outline allocation of resources by pandemic severity, hospital capacity 
and capability, and high-risk populations 
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• As the data indicates there will be a shortage of staff. It is recommended that Nebraska 
Medicine develop a student pandemic volunteer site to access during pandemic events for 
easy credentialing and badging  
• Provide Just-in-time training to assisting personnel, students, and volunteers 
• Implement a family care plan to reduce absenteeism during an influenza pandemic: this 
form helps identify and facilitate the care and support of family members during planned 
and unplanned contingencies 
• The literature indicates emergency rooms are the front lines of hospital care during a 
pandemic. ER’s report becoming quickly overwhelmed and needing more space to allow 
for the influx of patients. It is recommended that Nebraska Medicine create a detailed 
sitemap for possible surge space and triage areas throughout the hospital   
• The use of cots and beds in flat space areas (e.g., classrooms, gymnasiums, lobbies) 
within the hospital and UNMC for noncritical patients care 
 
  This project also encourages continuous emergency and disaster planning for constant 
improvement as public health emergencies, disease outbreaks, environments, and scenarios 
change. The outcome of the thesis helped to reinforce Nebraska Medicine and UNMC’s 
capabilities in supporting Douglas County resident’s health needs. While projection and 
recommendations apply specifically to Douglas County Nebraska and Nebraska Medicine, it is 
expected that certain themes and principles can be applied more broadly to other states.  
Limitations  
Zhang et al., state, "There is always a tradeoff between the advantages (ease of use and 
flexibility) and limitations (simplicity and potential imprecision) of mathematic modeling in 
decision making. FluSurge is limited in that only 3 broad age categories were considered and 
many other important epidemiologic, demographic, and behavioral characteristics were not 
modeled due to lack of reliable data" (Zhang et al., 2006). The FluSurge manual also addresses 
the issue surrounding the uncertainty of how the next pandemic will spread and the lack of data 
regarding the impact of influenza in previous pandemics. Zhang et al., declares that users of 
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disease modeling tools like FluAid and FluSurge2.0 "should not be overconfident in using a 
single estimate of impact when preparing their plans" (Zhang et al., 2006). Further limitations 
include Nebraska Medicines current market share. Due to the range of rates, the unit assumptions 
and demographics will need to be modified. It is possible that results in this thesis underrepresent 
the actual capacity needed for a future surge event. Nebraska Medicine will need to prepare and 
plan for the worst case scenario and adjust their pandemic action accordingly. 
Conclusion 
Considering the result presented in this thesis project a high influx of patients, increased 
demand of resources and supplies, operational constraints, and insufficient equipment during a 
pandemic, it is clear that pandemic planning related to space, staffing, and supplies is a vital part 
of Nebraska Medicine’s ability to function during surge events. It will also be important to 
exercise and test the plan in order to identify any gaps and avoid inadvertent errors that could 
arise during actual pandemic events. Nebraska Medicine’s decisions regarding pandemic 
response and operations should be adapted to reflect real-time information updates obtained 
during the course of a pandemic. Regular committee meetings and discussions to exchange 
hospital capabilities and capacity as well as current pandemic data will be vital in effective 
response efforts.  
Although the results and projections in this study are specific to Douglas  County 
Nebraska and Nebraska Medicine, the same methodology and disease modeling tool can be 
applied to any hospital in any location and would be useful for other disaster planning scenarios 
that could overwhelm normal hospital capacity and capabilities. State/local, federal, and global 
planning and preparedness efforts are a complex and lengthy process but worth considerable 
attention. All healthcare agencies and organizations should advocate for support to strengthen 
hospital preparedness plans. When advocating for additional resources (e.g. stockpiling inventory, 
SNS and vaccine allocation, and funding) health officials should present studies like this and 
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existing studies that involve pandemic modeling tools and disease burden projections to validate 
claims. 
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